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This paper is a preliminary
exploration
of the relationship
between
social
factors,
and conformity
to a set of prescribed
methodological
norms in applied
social science. Focusing our attention
on evaluative
research,
we seek to estimate
how variation
in type and nature of research sponsorship,
research context,
and
researcher
relationships
with sponsor
and host affect reported
conformity
to
methodological
prescriptions.
Analyzing
the self-reported
responses
of I52
evaluative
researchers
to a mail questionnaire,
we find: (a) that conformity
to
methodological
prescriptions
is very variable
among evaluative
researchers:
(b)
that the social factors here examined
seem to affect systematically
the degree of
conformity;
(c) that while no single social factor has a large net effect on conformity, simultaneously
occurring
values seem more conducive
to conformity,
i.e.,
characteristics
associated
with our “academic
model”
are correlated
with reported
higher conformity,
whereas
characteristics
associated
with our “entrepreneurial
model”
are correlated
with reported
lower conformity.
Our findings
suggest that, while traditional
social control mechanisms
increase the likelihood
of
adherence
to methodological
prescriptions
for those whose work fits or resembles
the “academic
model,”
when the model of work moves toward the “entrepreneurial” type, reported
conformity
decreases
with the absence of those traditional
mechanisms
of social control.
Insofar as the “entrepreneurial
model”
is increasingly becoming the predominant
work model in applied social science, our findings
suggest that future research should seek to explain variation
in conformity
among
the “entrepreneurs”
and to explore
the variety
of means by which to increase
conformity
within this model.

INTRODUCTION

Although the application of social science to practical problems of
policy and action is still in its early stages, a large body of
experience has been accumulated. . . , The experience is there,
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but it has not been systematically
reviewed or codified. Consequently, no one knows the present status of applied social
science. . . . (Met-ton, 1949, p. 161).
According to Merton (1949), one neglected responsibility
of social
science is to study the performance of professional social scientists. As
part of that study, he suggests we explore the conditions that limit and
make for achievement. In a way, what Merton was calling for nearly three
decades ago was the systematic inquiry into the models of social control
in applied social science.’ Of interest is that Cole and Cole (1973, pp. l-7),
in reviewing the sociology of science, note that “Interest in the social
organization of science and the ways in which this organization affects
scientific development has been slow in coming.” This is especially true
for the sociology of social science and even more so for the sociology of
applied social science.
Kornhauser (1962), Hagstrom (1965), Marcson (1966), Storer (1966),
Collins (1%8), Boalt (1969), and Blume (1974) have all addressed the
question of social control in science. Perhaps the most definitive thesis is
Hagstrom’s (1965) study of conformity to and deviation from norms in
basic science and the social factors affecting it. Using the concepts of
socialization, exchange, and social control, Hagstrom (1965, p. 52) explains the institution of science as follows:
The thesis is that social control in science is exercised in an
exchange system, a system wherein gifts of information are exchanged for recognition from scientific colleagues. Because scientists desire recognition, they conform to the goals and norms of
the scientific community.
Such control reinforces and compliments the socialization process in science. . . .
Importantly,
for our purposes, Hagstrom finds evidence to suggest that
there is substantial variation in the degree to which scientists conform to
norms, and that certain social factors significantly affect the degree of
conformity. However, Hagstrom (1965, p. 294) concludes his thesis by
stating that, to the extent that some groups of scientists may be more
strongly influenced than others by nonscientists, future research should
reexamine his thesis. One might argue that Hagstrom’s call for reexamination results partly from the fact that Hagstrom believes, as do Bernal
(1939), Polanyi (1951), and Kuhn (1962), that, as science moves from an
occupation of curious and ingenious minds supported by wealthy patrons
to an industry supported largely by the state, there will be an accompany’ According
to Hagstrom
seeks to determine
those
norms.

(1965, p. I), the study of social
factors conducive
to conformity

control in science is a study that
to or deviation
from scientific
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ing decrease in the influence of scientists on science and a concomitant
increase in the influence persons external to the scientific community
have on scientific work. Furthermore, Polanyi (1951), Kuhn (1962), and
Price (1968) have posited that the increased power the State has over
scientific work will result in a decreased motivation of scientists to excel.
Their argument is predicated on the assumption that freedom to select and
detine one’s own research problem is a central norm of science and the
primary incentive to do quality work (see also Roe, 1951; Kornhauser,
1962).
The pursuit of science can be organized therefore, in no other
manner than by granting complete independence to all mature
scientists. . . . The function of public authorities is not to plan
research, but only to provide opportunities for its pursuit. . . . To
do less is to neglect the progress of science: to do more is to
cultivate mediocrity and waste public money (Polanyi, 1951, p.
90).
Blume (1974) argues that the question is no longer one of debate, i.e., to
argue as Polanyi (1951), Price (1968) and others did over whether science
should be influenced by external forces: instead, the task now is to begin
to estimate the effects of these external forces.
Most generally, the research reported herein is addressed to a preliminary exploration of the question first raised by Merton (1949), i.e., how do
social factors limit and make for achievement in applied social science.
Focusing on the most rapidly expanding form of applied social science
research, i.e., evaluative research, we examine one aspect of achievement: conformity to a set of methodological
norms, and how a variety of
social factors affect such conformity.
More specifically and related to
Blume’s (1974) question, we concern ourselves with the variation on these
social factors, e.g., whether the research is funded as a result of a
judgment by a peer review panel, such as in the case of grants, or as a
result of a judgment by a review not relying on peer scientists, such as in
the case of contracts, and how the grant/contract difference correlates
with conformity. The study of evaluative researchers is particularly suited
to a preliminary exploration of these questions since there is considerable
variation on the variety of social factors here considered.
In order, we examine (1) if within this group of funded applied research
studies, there is substantial systematic variation in conformity to a set of
prescribed technical norms: (2) if so, can the set of social factors here
considered account for a significant amount of that variation in conformity; (3) what is the gross and net effect of each of the social factors on
conformity; (4) how do variations on the social factors specifically relate
to conformity: and (5) based on the results, what are the implications for
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understanding social control in applied social science research. By so
doing, we hope to lay the groundwork for further research on the sociology of social research, especially the kind of social research that is clearly
subject to external influences.
DATA AND METHODS
Sample

The sample used for the analyses that follow consists of 152 evaluative
researchers who received grant or contract support in the amount of
$10,000 or more, directly from an agency of the federal government, in
fiscal year 1970, for the purpose of measuring the process (implementation) and impact (effect) of a large-scale social action program in one of
the areas of health, education, welfare, manpower, income security,
public safety, and/or housing.2 The data come from these researchers’
responses to a mail questionnaire.
The study of evaluative researchers is strategic for addressing the
questions raised because the proliferation of program evaluation studies
has been accompanied by an increase in diversity of styles of organizing
research. Moreover, by limiting our analyses to one kind of applied social
science research, we can somewhat reduce the amount of variation in
conformity that might alternatively
be explained by a relationship between certain types of research problems and adherence to a set of
methodological
prescriptions. As stated above, our sample includes only
evaluators whose research tasks included the measurement of program
implementation
and program impact: and, this definition of the research
task was determined both by our screening of proposal abstracts and by
confirmation by the evaluators that they agreed with this task definition.
By limiting our sample to evaluators, all of whom received their initial
funding in the same l-year time frame, we add a measure of control for
changes in the definition of appropriate methodologies that might result
* The data on the 152 evaluative researchers are drawn from a larger sample of evaluative
researchers surveyed as research studies by Bernstein and Freeman (1975). Bernstein and
Freeman surveyed the total population of evaluation studies first funded by a federal
agency in fiscal 1970 (N = 382). Of those 382, they report that 83% of the 382 responded to
their mail questionnaire, netting a sample size of 318. Of the 318 questionnaires returned, 82
included responses indicating that, despite extensive prescreening, the study named was not
an evaluative study. Bernstein and Freeman comment upon these 82 cases, but include in
their analysis only the remaining 236 cases. They further report that their available data on
respondents and nonrespondents showed no differences between the two groups. Of the 236
studies included in their review, 152 were comprehensive
evnluarions,
i.e., evaluative
studies that included both procedures to measure process (program implementation) and
impact (program effectiveness).
Importantly, the analyses and discussion reported here differ significantly from those in
Bernstein and Freeman (1975) insofar as here we examine data for a subsample and focus
our attention on a subset of factors selected to address in greater depth the theoretical
questions posed in our introduction.
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with the passage of time. Finally, our exclusion of similar studies that
were unfunded, funded by some agency other than a federal funding
agency, funded indirectly, or funded with a research budget (independent
of the program budget) of less than $10,000 was motivated by our concern
for circumscribing
a sample of research studies that were more similar
than dissimilar to one another, without losing the diversity in social
factors here examined, the effect of which we wished to track.
Our study is limited by the fact that we could not make use of an
experimental design, i.e., we could not persuade the government to agree
to assign randomly the evaluative studies to a variety of research organization conditions. As such, our analyses can only make statements about
corelationships rather than causal relationships. Moreover, in the absence
of a true experiment, we cannot control for self-selection effects. While
we can make some assumptions about their strength as rival hypotheses,
future research will have to probe more directly into the degree to which
self-selection alters, modifies, or refutes our findings. These limitations
not withstanding, we proceed with our presentation, keeping in mind that
our research is exploratory; nonetheless, it is the first effort to examine
systematically
one aspect of achievement in applied social science research.
Measuring Conformity
According to Merton (1942), Barber (1952), Kuhn (1962), Hagstrom
(1965), Storer (1966), and Blume (1974), there exists in science a dominant
set of institutional
norms that proscribe and describe appropriate moral
and technical behavior. While there has been some debate as to the degree
to which the moral norms actually guide scientists’ attitudes and behavior
(Mitroff, 1974), that there are a set of agreed-upon prescriptions for
technical procedures seems not to be challenged.”
Kuhn (1962, pp. 5-6) argues that normal science rests upon the assumption that the scientific community shares definitions of appropriate problems for study as well as legitimate methods for conducting the various
studies. In the process of articulating these definitions, a set of standard
procedures for conducting research is set forth (1962, pp. 27,76). According to Hagstrom (1%5), Storer (1966), and Blume (1974), scientists con3 This is not to deny that debates over approaches
or orientation
in science do not occur.
Rather, it is to accept a Kuhnian
(1%2, pp. 37, 76) notion of science that argues that, at any
particular
procedures

point
in time,
for researching

there
is general
consensus
specijc
types of scientijk

about
problems.

appropriate

methodological

Since we limit ourselves
to
persons conducting
comprehensive
program
evaluations,
each seeking to identify
the degree
to which program
implementation
causes changes
on the desired
outcome
measures,
it seems appropriate
to assume
that there
is general
consensus
about
prescribed
methodologies:
and, apart from the few dissensions
reviewed
in Footnote
4, a review of the
evaluation
literature
would seem to support
such an assumption
of consensus.
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form to these norms because it allows them to continue participation
in
the exchange system whereby competent responses and recognition are
exchanged for efforts that evidence adherence to methodological
norms.
One way of measuring conformity to technical norms is to select a set of
norms, to examine adherence to each norm individually,
and then to
construct a composite index and measure the degree of adherence to it. In
order to determine which norms should be examined and what they
specifically prescribe as methodologically
appropriate, it is necessary to
examine the methodological
literature that sets forth guidelines for
conducting research.
A systematic review of the evaluative research literature reveals that
six basic methodological
issues are repeatedly addressed: (1) the method
used to select the sample population: (2) the type of data analytic techniques used, e.g., multivariate statistical analysis: (3) the general nature of
the data analytic process, e.g., quantitative:
(4) the type of research
design, e.g., experimental design: (5) the validity of the measurement
procedures: and (6) the representativeness of the sample to the appropriate universe.
Generally, it is asserted that the sample population
to be observed
should be selected as a probability sample (see for example, Suchman,
1967, pp. 102-103: Anderson, 1975: Bernstein, 1975). By randomly selecting the group(s) to be observed, certain rival hypotheses, e.g., selection
factors, maturation,
become less of a threat to problems of internal
validity. Second, it is asserted that multivariate
statistical procedures
should be used (see for example Wholey, Scanlon, Duffy, Fukumoto, and
Vogt, 1970, Chap. 6; Alwin and Sullivan, 1975; Eber, 1975). Insofar as
evaluative research implies a need for causal analysis, and insofar as
evaluative researchers can rarely rely on true experimental designs to rule
out threats to internal validity, multivariate statistical techniques are prescribed as a substitute in the absence of random assignment of persons to
control and experimental groups. Third, it is argued that evaluative research should be predominantly
quantitative in terms of the nature of the
data analytic processes (see for example, Rossi, 1972, pp. 3, 16,46). This
present preference for quantification may in part be a reaction against the
qualitative evaluations that dominated until the mid-1960s. As Bernstein
and Sheldon (1977) note, qualitative methods were often used when the fear
of a negative evaluation was present, since softer measures could be
reinterpreted more easily than hard empirical data to cover up for program
failure. Moreover, the expressed preference for quantitative methods over
qualitative, or even over part qualitative and part quantitative, stems in
large part from the fact that: (a) the “ideal” model for evaluative research is
the experimental
model (Riecken and Boruch, 1974); (b) implementing
such a design, or an approximation
of it, e.g., quasi-experimental,
requires
quantitative
data analysis; and (c) quantitative analyses are far more
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readily suited to the making of causal statements. Experimental
designs
focus on the problem of attribution, and attribution implies causality.
Fourth, with respect specifically to the type of research design, Rossi
(1972, p. 16) argues, “[The] main methodological
model [for evaluative
research] is the controlled experiment and its derivatives.”
Similarly,
Riecken et al. (1974), Boruch (1974), and others have argued that the
experimental or quasi-experimental
design model is the most desirable
and appropriate one as long as evaluations seek to demonstrate causality
(see for example, Campbell, 1971; Cain and Hollister,
1972: Stanley,
1972).4 Fifth, the importance of reliable and valid measurement procedures is underscored by Hyman and Wright (1967, p. 743), Suchman
(1967, p. llO), and Nunnally (1975). Last, it is said that the sample(s)
observed should be a reasonable sample of the universe to which one
wants to generalize (see Suchman, 1967: Bernstein, Bohrnstedt, and
Borgatta, 1975: and Cook and Campbell, 1975). Suchman (1967, p. 103)
states: “If the results [of the evaluation] are to be meaningful, the group
one uses in the evaluative project should be representative of the target
group for the full scale operating program.“5
Analysis Procedures

In accordance with the literature review referred to above, a six-item
index of methodological
prescriptions was constructed to serve as the
dependent variable, i.e., the measure of conformity to basic technical
norms. To determine the degree of conformity, the evaluative researchers’ responses to questions ascertaining what methodological procedures
were used were coded for each of six items. The six items include: method
used for sample selection, type of data analytic techniques used, nature of
data analyses procedures, type of research design, validity of measurement procedures, and representativeness
of the sample.6 Importantly,
4 Weiss and Rein (1970) and Edwards, Guttentag, and Snapper (1975) argue that alternative approaches, e.g., a decision theoretic approach, may be more useful to evaluation given the
political context in which it is ordinarily conducted. However, even the critics of the
experimental model do not reject it so much as they see it as too difficult to implement. The
fact that Boruch (1974) has mustered substantial evidence to the contrary, i.e., he has
delimited an extensive list of experiments successfully mounted in evaluative research,
coupled with the absence of evidence for general acceptance of the decision theoretic
approach, leads us to conclude that, at this point in time, the general consensus still supports
the use of the experimental model.
5 Williams and Evans (1969, pp. 118-132) and Wholey et al. (1970, p. 98) similarly argue
that the only meaningful evaluations are those executed in program settings representative
of settings likely to be used for similar programs and on target populations representative of
likely future target populations.
6 For example, the questionnaire asked “Does the research plan to measure impact or
change include an experimental or quasi-experimental design?” and “Instead of or in
addition to an experimental design, are any of the following approaches utilized? Check all
that apply: Longitudinal study without control or comparison groups; cross-sectional study
without control or comparison groups: . .”
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however, each item was first analyzed separately by means of tabular
analysis to determine the appropriateness of using a composite index.
Since the pattern of relationships between each of the independent variables-and each of the dependent variables separately was consistent across
all six dependent variables, it seemed appropriate to create one composite
index (the construction of the index is explained in detail below). Furthermore, we computed an (Ymeasure, according to Bohmstedt (1%9), to
determine the reliability of the constructed composite index. The (Yfor our
six-item index is .69.
In order to assign scores to each questionnaire response for each of the
six items, we referred back to the literature review and rank ordered the
responses for each item, giving the highest score to the procedure most
highly recommended and the lowest score to the procedure least recommended. For example, on the item “research design,” a “3” was assigned to the use of an experimental OR quasi-experimental
design with
both randomization
and control groups: a “2” was assigned to the use of
an experimental OR quasi-experimental
design with either randomization
or control groups; a “1” was assigned to the use of a longitudinal
or
cross-sectional design without a control or comparison group; and, a “0”
was assigned to the use of descriptive testimony or narratives as the
research design.7
To construct the index, each of the six items, i.e., methodological
procedures, was weighted by l/m-l where m was the number of response
categories. In this way, each of the six items has equal weight in the
composite scale. The total score was equal to the sum of the products of
the response code multiplied by the weight for each item. The total scores
range from 0 to 6, 6 representing the highest degree of conformity.8 The
mean score on the index is 4.0: the standard deviation is 1.4.
To estimate the effects of the social factors on the index of conformity,
dummy variable regression procedures are used.g To estimate net effects,
’ An example of a descriptive design is the case of an evaluator who reported measuring
program impact by asking the program staff to describe the program effectsat severalpoints
during the intervention. An example of a narrative design is the case of an evaluator who
reported that he observed the program in action and used his own verbal descriptionas
evidence of program effect.
’ Using self-reported responses may cause concern about the reliability of such responses. However, given that the questionnaire asks “What methodological procedures
were followed,” and given it is common knowledge that certain procedures are preferred,
we suggest that, if any bias exists, it is in the direction of inflating the degree of conformity.
Furthermore, respondents did know that access to materials that would verify or question
their responses could be made available to us. Thus, we suggest that the likelihood of false
responses was low.
’ While some may question the appropriateness of regression analysis with these kind of
data, the arguments by Cohen (1968) and Kerlinger and Pedhazur (1973) are quite convincing. Moreover, as indicated earlier, the analyses were run using tabular formats too, i.e..
each of the independent variables was run against the dependent variable “conformity,”
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i.e., the amount of unique variance, we deleted, in turn, each set of
dummy variables used to represent the particular independent variable
from the full equation. Thus, the net effect is the difference between the
RZ when all the dummy variables are entered into the equation and the R2
when the set of dummies for the particular independent variable in quation was deleted.
Independent

Variables

In determining a set of independent variables to consider, our intent
was to include social factors that tap some aspects of the external influence, the kind of which Polanyi (1951), Hagstrom (1965), and Price (1968)
posited to be likely to affect conformity to scientific norms. Accordingly,
we examine the effect of each of the following on our measure of conformity to methodological
norms: (1) the federal agency that sponsored the
evaluator’s research effort, e.g., NIMH,
LEAA: (2) the nature of the
research award given the evaluator, e.g., contract, grant: (3) the amount
of research funds allocated for the evaluator’s research: (4) the number of
years for which funding was approved: (5) the type of organization with
which the evaluative researcher is affiliated, e.g., profit, nonprofit, university; (6) the major audience (as defined by the evaluator) to whom
research findings are addressed, apart from the research sponsor; (7) the
formal organizational arrangement between the organization administering the social action program being evaluated and the organization with
which the evaluator is affiliated, e.g., the evaluator is affiliated with the
same organization as that administering
the action program, i.e., the
evaluator is an inside evaluator; (8) the informal working relationship
between the evaluation staff administering
the action program vis-i-vis
research decisions, e.g., decisions concerning research design are made
jointly between the two staffs; and (9) the informal working relationship
between the staff of the federal agency sponsoring the evaluation and the
evaluation staff vis-$-vis research decisions.‘O
once using conformity as a seven-field category (O-6)
into three groups arbitrarily called high, medium,
and

and once collapsing the categories
low conformity.
As expected,
the
tests are identical
to those reported
for

results of the tabular analyses using nonparametric
the regression
analyses.
‘” It may seem that certain critical
variables,
although
not representative
of the kind of
external
influence
about which Polanyi
was concerned,
are left out in our analyses.
For
example,
such variables
might relate to characteristics
about the evaluative
researcher.
We
should note here that, in prior analyses.
we found that the highest degrees of the evaluators
as well as their years of research experience
had no significant
effects on conformity.
In fact,
it was their lack of effect that partly stimulated
our interest in homing in on the factors
considered
here. Since our research
is exploratory,
we suggest that future analyses gather
more in-depth
data on both the characteristics
of the researcher
as well as the social factors
considered
here so as to allow for a meaningful
comparison
of their relative
effects on
conformity.
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Results
First, in order to determine whether or not there is deviation from the
index of technical norms, we examined the distribution of scores. Given
that the norms were described in the literature as basic to any well-done
evaluation study, ideally, one would expect the majority of scores to be
near perfect. Our analyses indicate that 11% (iV = 16) of the 152 evaluative
researchers used all six prescribed methodological
procedures, i.e., attained a score of 6 on our index. Clearly, deviation from technical norms
is high in evaluative research. If one recalls that our data are based on
self-reported responses, this finding becomes more significant insofar as if
the self-reported nature of the data collection is biased, the bias is almost
certainly in the direction of producing an inflated rather than deflated
estimate of conformity.
The finding of substantial deviation from technical norms is consonant
with the conclusions of those who have previously examined scientific
research (Hagstrom, 1965) and policy research, e.g., Whyte and Hamilton
(1%4), Wilkins (1969), Wholey et al. (1970), and Stromsdorfer (1972).
Wholey et al. (1970), for example, in reviewing evaluative research
funded by four federal agencies, concluded that few significant program
evaluations have been undertaken, and most of those carried out were
poorly conceived, poorly executed, and poorly disseminated.
Second, in order to determine the degree to which the variation in
conformity found could be explained by the social factors delimited earlier, we regressed the index of conformity on the nine factors. The RZ is
.301, significant at the .OOl level. I1 Thus, we conclude that the social
factors examined here do have a statistically significant effect on conformity.
Third, to estimate the effect of each of the nine factors individually on
conformity, we regressed the index of conformity on the set of dummy
variables used to represent each factor. Table 1 presents the gross and net
effects for each variable. Seven of the nine factors examined have statistically significant gross effects on the index of conformity: the amount of
funds and the working relationship vis-a-vis research decisions between
the evaluators and the sponsoring agency staff are the two exceptions.
The net effects, however, are all very sma11.12This is probably due to the
fact that no single factor has a large unique net effect on conformity.
Rather, the variance is shared, and, as will be discussed later, patterns of
‘I Given the nature of our particular
sample, it is not clear that significance
tests are
relevant.
However,
until the significance
test controversy
is resolved,
we will opt to
continue
to present them.
‘* While we present the net effects to provide
an estimate
of the unique variance
explained,
it should be kept in mind that variables
can be very important
and can have
nonsignificant
net effects because their contribution
to the explained
variance
is shared.
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TABLE 1
Gross and Net Effects for Each of the Social
Factors on the Index of Conformity
Variable
Sponsoring agency
Nature of award
Amount of funds
Number of years for award
Type of organization with which
researcher is affiliated
Major audience for findings
Formal organizational arrangement
between education and action program
organizations
Working relationship between evaluation
and action staffs re research decisions
Working relationship between evaluation
and sponsoring agency staff re research
decisions

Gross effects

Net effects
.008
.032*
,009
.055*
.011
,002

,0**4*

,002

,O(jO””

,000

.035

,005

‘: Significant at .05.
i::‘XSignificant at .Ol.
CO* Significantat JO1,

values occurring simultaneously seem to be more or less conducive to the
kind of conformity being considered.
To examine the way in which the specific dummy vairable categories,
e.g., grant, affect the conformity index, we present the unstandardized
regression coefficients (Table 2). Given our finding that only two of the
independent variables have significant net effects, we are not surprised to
find that few of the regression coefficients are statistically significant.
While the fact that they are not statistically significant means only that the
category which the dummy variable represents does not significantly
differ from the left out category, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of
no difference. Based on Table 2, we conclude that evaluators funded
under contract auspices are less likely to conform to methodological
prescriptions, as are evaluators whose time frame falls between 12 and 18
months.
The fact that the total variance explained is .301 and that seven of the
nine independent variables have statistically significant gross effects, yet
few variables have significant net effects (and few dummy variables have
significant regression coefficients) leads us to reiterate our earlier conclusion that the variance explained is largely shared rather than unique. As
such, we turn our attention toward a search for patterns of simultaneously
occurring values that might have some predictive utility and theoretical
meaning.
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TABLE 2
Unstandardized Regression Coefficients, Standard Errors, I Values, and
Frequencies for Each Category of Each Independent Variable
Variables

Sponsoring agency”
NlHlNlMH
Housing and Urban Development,
Agriculture, Labor, Office of Economic
Opportunity
Oflice of Education or HEW other than NIH,
NIMH, SRS
Department of Justice
Social Rehabilitation

Services

Nature of award
Grant
Contract
Amount of funds
$150,ooo +
$ I o,ooo-49,999
$100,000-149,999
$50,000-99,999
Duration of award
3 years +
Less than I year
I .5-2 years
2-3 years
l-1.5 years
Type of organization
Educational institution or affiliate
Profit research corporation
Nonprofit research corporation

Unstandardized
regression
coefficient
(SE)

t Value

Frequency

+.026
(.&O)
-b

.056

30% (45)

-.034
C.408)
-.I59
(.558)
-.360
(.437)

.084

9% (14)

.286

22% (34)

- .986
(.403)
-.I43
(.347)
-.342
(.349)
-.355
(.329)
-.05l

24% (37)

.825

15% (22)
100%

2.445

5% (89)
41% (63)
100%

.4l I

2% (42)
25% (36)

.980

21% (31)

I .079

25% (36)
100%

,116

2% (43)
I I% (17)

.762

19% (28)

I.113

22% (33)

2.949

20% (30)

(442)
-.275
(.361)
-.349
(.314)
-1.007
(.342)
+.461
(.325)
+.247
(.367)
+.236
(.359)

100%
1.420

32% (49)

,673

28% (42)
21% (31)
(Conrinued)
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2 (Continued)

Variables

Unstandardized
regression
coefficient
(SE)

Public service or planning agency

r Value

-

Frequency

20% (30)
100%

Major audiencec
Cosmopolitan

+.I98
(.281)
-

Local

,705

30% (45)
70% (106)
100%

Formal organizational
Evaluator “inside”

arrangement

Evaluator “outside”

+.204
(.330)
-

,618

41% (63)
59% (89)
100%

Working relationship between evaluator and
action
Action staff review decisions about research
made by the evaluator
Evaluator and action staff make decisions
about research jointly
Evaluator makes decisions about research
independent of the action staff

-t.o39
(.305)
+ .036
C.305)
-

Working relationship between evaluation and
sponsoring agency
+.25g
Sponsor makes research decisions independent
c.502)
of evaluator
+.I58
Sponsors review decisions about research
c.272)
made by evaluator
Evaluator makes decisions about research
independent of sponsor
-.095
Evaluator and sponsoring staff make decisions
C.345)
about research jointly
Intercept = 4.538.

.I29

23% (34)

.I 17

44% (67)
33% (50)
100%

,515

5% (8)

S3l

38% (58)
40%, (60)

.273

17% (26)
106%

D Agencies were grouped together on the basis of similar operating practices and similar
missions.
b Left-out category.
if the respondents indicated that they
c Major audience was defined as “cosmopolitan”
did or intend to maximize communication with other colleagues and researchers and to
publish the results in journals and/or monographs. If the respondent indicated otherwise,
e.g., communication would be maximized with government officials and results would be
disseminated in government reports, the response for audience was classified as “local.”
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An examination
of a correlation
matrix for each of the response
categories reveals two interesting patterns. The first is one of awards
funded by research oriented agencies, e.g., NIMH, in the form of grants,
for 3 or more years, to evaluators in educational institutions who define
their major audience as cosmopolitan,
who work as “insiders,”
and who
make research decisions jointly with the staff of the action program (see
Table 3).13 The second is one of awards funded by service-oriented agen-

Correlation

TABLE 3
Matrix of Response Categories for Academic-Type

$50-99 on funds (I)”
NIH/NlMH sponsored (2)
Grant (3)
3+ years (4)
Evaluator in educational institution (5)
Cosmopolitan
audience (6)
“Inside” evaluator (7)
Evaluator and action
staff make joint
research decisions (8)

Group0

(6)

(5)

(1)

(2)

2, ‘-::
II
00

4 , ‘”1:a

03

32***

29***

l7**

-

11
11

37***
a***

35***
45***

35***
26***

21**
,3*

-

12

28***

33***

21**

18**

16*

(3)

(4)

(7)

(8)

_

28:““:‘; 26”Z:::: _

26*** f&-j*** -

o The variable “working relationship between sponsor and evaluator” is not included
because there is no clear pattern of association between any particular response on that
variable and these other response categories. While the same is true of the variable “budget
size,” it is presented here as an item of possible interest.
* Budget is in thousands.
“p < .0.5.
:::::p < ,o,.
:.:j’:::;
p < JO,,

ties, e.g., SRS, in the form of contracts, for 12 to 18 months, to evaluators
in profit research corporations who define their major audience as locals,
who work “outside,” and who make research decisions independent of the
staff administering the action program (see Table 4). For convenience sake,
we label the first group the “academic model,” and the second, the “entrepreneurial model.”
To determine whether a comparison of these two model types provides
insight into our understanding of conformity, we computed a predicted
I3 The amount of funds allocated for the research and the relationship between the
sponsoring agency and the evaluation staff regarding research decisions are not included in
the discussion since neither variable was found to have a significant gross effect on conformity.
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TABLE 4
Matrix of Response Categories for Entrepreneur-Type
(1)

$l50+ funds ( I)b
Sponsor: HUD, AG,
OEO, Labor (2)
Contract (3)
l-l.5 years (4)
Evaluator in profit
research corporation (5)
Local audience (6)
“Outside” evaluator (7)
Evaluator makes research
decisions independent
of action staff (8)

(2)

(3)

(6)

(5)

(4)

Group”
(7)

(8)

jg**r:

_

35*** 2f+*** fjo***
-14*
-06
37***

15*

24***
II
12

28”“” 352?‘*
28”“:“: 45”*”

47***

IO

15*

2,“”

-

IS**

-

,2

36”“:”

04

2oL’* 14”

08

28”““: _

u The variable “working relationship between sponsor and evaluator”
for reasons cited in the note in Table 3.
b Budget is in thousands.

2(j**::’

_

is not included here

*p < .05.
** p < .01.
***p < .ool.

mean score for each pattern by adding the regression constant, i.e., 4.54,
to the unstandardized regression coefficient for each response category
(dummy variable) named above. The predicted mean for the “academic
type” is 5.47; the predicted mean for the “entrepreneurial
type” is 2.43.
This difference suggests that these ideal-type patterns are correlated with
conformity, and that the academic-type model is more conducive to the
likelihood that there will be adherence to technical norms.
DlSCUSSlON

In order to explore why it is that evaluations more closely fitting the
“academic type” are correlated with reported higher conformity to methodological prescriptions, we organize our discussion around a consideration of each of the categories included in that model type. Importantly,
however, one must keep in mind the fact that few of these categories have
unique effects on conformity.
Beginning with the sponsoring agency, from Table 1 we conclude that
the sponsoring agency affects conformity. From Table 3 we note that
being sponsored by NIH or NIMH is correlated with the “academic
model.” The question is, what is it about NIH/NIMH
sponsorship that
might explain its correlation with conformity to methodological
norms.
First, at the time of our study, NIH/NIMH
was the only agency that made
extensive use of an external peer review system. Second, by its heavy
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reliance on the open grant system, agency decisions to support proposed
research were purportedly made on the basis of projected conformity to
technical norms and evidence of ability to adhere to technical prescriptions. Third, the heavy reliance on the open grant system may have
created a highly competitive system whereby only proposals evidencing
merit of support would be funded. In terms of the use of an external peer
review system, Polanyi (1951, pp. 65-66) and Price (1968) argue that the
conferring of research support must remain in the hands of representatives of the scientific community
if professional standards are to be
maintained. Their argument is predicated on the assumption that scientists alone are competent to judge the viability of proposed work. In terms
of the relationship between competition and conformity, Simmel(1955,
p.
60) and Hagstrom (1965, p. 39) note that competition is likely to increase
commitment to norms and that the lack of it is likely to increase deviation.
The nature of the award, a variable highly correlated with the sponsoring agency, has a substantial gross effect on conformity and one of the
only two significant net effects (see Table 1). From Table 2 we note that
evaluators funded under contract auspices are less likely to conform to
technical norms than are those funded under grant auspices. This finding
may be a function of the fact that grants and contracts can be differentiated according to (a) the degree of participation of representatives of
the scientific community in decisions about which research to support, (b)
the degree of autonomy afforded the researcher by virtue of the type of
award,14 and/or (c) the degree of competition for receipt of the award.
Grants tend to be allocated as the result of peer review: they are traditionally awarded to researchers studying scientific problems identified
and delimited $first by the researcher, and competition for them is quite
extensive. Contracts, at the time of our study, were generally awarded not
after peer review, but rather on the basis of decisions by funding agency
staff, usually persons who were not formally credentialed representatives
of the scientific community.
Furthermore,
contracts were usually
awarded on an RFP system: thus, the research problem and design for
execution were defined and initiated first by the funding officer rather than
by the researcher. Last, partly because of the particular demands of
contracts, e.g., time specifications, competition for contracts is limited to
the very few persons and groups capable and willing to work under the
specific terms of the award.15
References for support of the finding that peer review in a competitive
I4 By autonomy, we mean autonomy to define the research problem, delimit the scope of
the problem, and select the methods by which to study the problem.
I5 An additional difference between grants and contracts that we can assume to be
present, but about which we have no evidence or data, is that persons may self-select
themselves into those two categories on the basis of factors that may be related to our
measure of conformity. For example, it may be that when a person has a clear research
problem, with a good research plan, that person might apply for a grant: however, faced with
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system is likely to increase conformity have already been cited. Regarding
the relationship between autonomy and conformity, Polanyi (1951), Roe
(1951), Whyte (1956), Kuhn (1962), Kornhauser (1962), Hagstrom (1965),
Freidson (1970), and Zuckerman and Met-ton (1971) argue that autonomy
is a primary incentive for conformity, and the lack of it a stimulus for
deviation.
Before turning to the next variable, an additional point needs to be
made, i.e., that our data suggest that the presence of a peer review system
is correlated with greater conformity. Table 5 presents a mean breakdown
of scores on the index of conformity by agency and by nature of award.
TABLE 5
Mean Scores of Evaluation Researchers Receiving Grant or Contract Support
from Federal Agencies on the Index of Conformity”
National Institutes of
Health/Mental Health
4.62 (45)
Grant
4.86 (40)

Contract
2.70 (5)

Social Rehabilitation Services Office of Education, HUD,
or Law Enforcement
Agriculture, Labor, OEO, or
Assistance Administration
HEW other than NIMH/NIH
or SRS
4.04 (48)
3.51 (58)
Grant
4.08 (42)

Contract
3.69 (6)

Grant
4.79 (7)

Contract
3.33 (51)

0 NIH, NIMH, and Office of Education peer reviewed grants but not contracts in FY 1970.
LEAA
rarely used peer reviews on either grants or contracts in FY 1970. HUD,
Agriculture, Labor, OEO, and HEW (other than SRS, NIH, NIMH) did not award any grants
in FY 1970. Note: Overall mean is 4.0; SD is 1.4.
SRS,

Although the cells are small, the pattern seems clear. In funding agencies
in which grants and contracts differed according to the presence or abpersons receiving grants
sence of a peer review system, i.e., NIH/NJMH,
fared better on the index than did those receiving contracts. However, for
agencies in which the grant and contract mechanisms did not differ, e.g.,
Social Rehabilitation
Services, which at the time of our study made little
or no use of peer review, regardless of whether the award was a grant or
contract, we find no difference between persons supported under grant
versus those supported under contract auspices. In view of the recent
debates over peer review in Science (Gustafson, 1975), this seems important to note.
The number
of years allocated for the research significantly and
a “murkier” research problem, and a research plan open to methodological criticism, that
person might apply for a contract, hoping that the importance of the “murky” problem will
outweigh the liabilities of the methodological inadequacies. Or, it may be that more
methodologically sophisticated researchers apply for grants, while those with less methodological skills apply for contracts. In the absence of data, we can only raise these issues as
potentially relevant to understanding our own findings as well as important considerations
for future research.
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uniquely affects conformity (see Table 1). From Table 3 we conclude that
evaluative researchers working under minimum-time
constraints (3 years
or more) are more likely to conform to technical norms. According to
Parsons (1951, p. 335) and Kornhauser (1962, pp. 52-53), scientists generally prefer work arrangements that allow for lengthy probes and the
exhaustive testing of ideas.
The type of organization has a significant gross effect on conformity
(see Table 1). From Table 3 we note that being affiliated with educational
institutions is a characteristic of the “academic model.” Thus, the question again is one of explaining what it is about educational institutions that
might contribute to its correlation with conformity to methodological
norms. Our contention is that educational institutions are most likely to
define goals that are similar, if not identical, to the goals of the scientific
community,
e.g., publishing theoretically
relevant, methodologically
competent work. Moreover, in educational institutions, responsibility for
work is usually allocated to particular individuals rather than to diffuse
groups: and educational institutions are purportedly governed by colleague rather than hierarchical control. According to Parsons (1951), Orth
(1959), Kornhauser (1962), and Hagstrom (1965), the university is the
institution
most likely to embody the norms of science. Furthermore,
Hagstrom (1965) asserted that conformity to norms is most likely to occur
when work responsibility
is allocated specifically (to individuals) rather
than diffusely (to groups), since only with specific responsibility
can
major rewards be obtained. Finally, Whyte (1965), Weinberg (1961), and
Kornhauser (1962) suggest that conformity to scientific norms is more
likely when the authority structure of the work organization is characterized by colleague rather than hierarchical control, since hierarchical
control may lead to a redefinition of goals and the bases for rewards other
than those ordinarily embraced by the scientific community, e.g., the goal
of getting more research funds may replace the goal of conducting quality
research.
From Table 1 we note that the major audience has a significant gross
effect, and from Table 3 we see that defining one’s major audience as
cosmopolitanI
is part of the “academic model.”
For the group of
evaluators (the cosmopolitans)
who define other researchers and colleagues as their major audience and who indicate that they have or will
publish their findings in refereed journals and/or monographs, it is likely
that they conform to technical norms because their reference group and
the mode of dissemination they use (or seek to use) require such conformity. However, for the other evaluators (the locals), who define the
government and public officials as their major audience, and who publish
(or plan to publish) their findings in government publications or mimeoI6 For a definition of the difference between “cosmopolitan”
on Table 2.

and “local,”

see Footnote b
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graphed organizational
documents, their reference group and selected
mode of dissemination do not require conformity to technical norms. As
such, they are not motivated to do so or at least not by their reference
group.
The formal organizational
arrangement
between the evaluative researcher and the organization administering
the action program being
evaluated has a significant gross effect on conformity (see Table 1).
According to Table 3, having an organizational
affiliation the same as
the organization administering the action program, i.e., being “inside,” is
part of the academic model. (It is critical to note here that few “inside
evaluators” are the same people as the administrators of the program being
evaluated.)”
The finding that being “inside” is part of the model type
more highly correlated with conformity is particularly interesting in view
of the fact that a review of evaluative research literature reveals very
mixed support for the “inside” position (see Caro, 1971, p. 17). Arguments made in favor of insiders hypothesize that insiders will be better
equipped to develop knowledge about and measurements for program
process and program effectiveness, better able to do continuing research,
have greater access to important data records, and be better able to mediate
problems ensuing from practitioner-scientist
research relationships. Arguments made in favor of outsiders hypothesize that outsiders will be
better able to maintain objectivity,
more able to include criteria that
question organizational premises and effectiveness, better protected from
problems of marginality and status incongruity, and better able to withstand requests to engage in time-consuming
nonresearch acts. We contend that the political liabilities of being outside may be so great so as to
force evaluators to compromise scientific rigor in order to be able to
execute some small part of the intended research. Argyris (1958), Angel1
(1967), Aronson and Sherwood (1967), and Coleman (1971) have all addressed the litany of complaints of evaluative researchers whose work has
been compromised
or thwarted by uncooperative
social action staffs.
Since this finding is somewhat unexpected, we will return to a further
exploration of it shortly.
” Bernstein
and Freeman
(1975) report that, of the 236 evaluation
studies they reviewed,
38% were conducted
by evaluators
working
within the same organization
as that administering the social action program:
42% by evaluators
working
in partly or completely
different
organizations:
12% by evaluators
working
in different
organizations
where one organization
was a subcontractor
of the other: and 8% by evaluators
who, along with the action staff
administrators,
were both separate subcontractors
of a third organization.
Of the 38% where
the evaluation
staff and action staff were part of the same organization,
in only 25% of the 90
cases was the evaluation
staff the same person(s)
as the staff administering
the action
program.
Thus, only 9% were simultaneouslyprogramadministrators
andevaluative
researchers. An example
of an “inside evaluator”
is a psychiatrist
on the staff of Harvard
who acts
as the evaluator
for a mental health program
run out of the Harvard
Medical Center.
While
the evaluator
and the program
administrator
are both members
of the same organization,
their immediate
work groups are quite distinct.
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The working relationship between the evaluation staff and the action
program staff vis-a-vis research decisions has a significant gross effect
(see Table 1). From Table 3 we note that joint decisions made by the two
staffs are correlated with the academic model. Freeman and Sherwood
(1%5), Coleman (197 l), and Kellam (1973) state that the politically sensitive nature of conducting evaluative research makes it essential for the
two groups to work jointly in making research decisions. Extensive consultation with the action program staff can provide access to essential data
about program process and program goals, as well as serve as a vehicle for
establishing a cooperative relationship
between the two staffs. They
suggest, too, that this cooperative working arrangement is more crucial
when the evaluator is an “outside”
evaluator.
Because these last two variables are intercorrelated,18 and because the
literature is so varied in terms of what is likely to correlate with conformity, we present Table 6 as an exploratory consideration of what might
occur if we were to consider simultaneously
the effects of these two
variables on conformity.1g While the “inside” evaluative researcher fared
better on conformity than the “outsider,”
when inside, it seems less
TABLE 6
Mean Scores of Evaluation Researchers in Varied Formal Organizational
Arrangements with Varied Informal Working Arrangements
on the Index of Conformity”
Inside

Outside

Evaluator and action staff in same
organization

Evaluator and action staff in different
organizations

4.55 (62)

3.63 (89)

Research decisions
made interdependently with
action staff

Research decisions
reviewed by or
made independent
of action staff

Research decisions
made interdependently with
action staff

Research decisions
reviewed by or
made independent
of action staff

4.55 (48)

4.56 (14)

4.01 (19)

3.52 (70)

a Note: Overall mean is 4.0; SD is 1.4.
I8 The correlation between being inside and working interdependently is .56. The correlation between being outside and working interdependently is -60. The correlation between
being outside and working independent of the action staff is .39. These three correlations are
all significant at the ,001 level.
I8 We say exploratory consideration because the small number of cases does not allow for
a meaningful examination of this possible interaction effect. In spite of this, we did do a
difference of means test: the differences were not statistically significant.
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important that the two make research decisions interdependently.
However, when the evaluator was “outside,” it seemed that an interdependent
(joint) working relationship vis&vis research decisions increased the
likelihood of greater conformity.
Both these findings suggest that what
might be important is that the two groups have either some formal or
informal arrangement so that cooperation can be facilitated and mechanisms for gaining access to the necessary information can be provided.
Summarily, while the data don’t show a statistically significant interaction
effect, such an effect might be demonstrable if one had a larger sample of
cases.
CONCLUSION
In terms of Met-ton’s (1949) original question about the factors that
make for achievement in applied social science, our data lead us to
conclude that, (a) When the representatives of the scientific community
are active participants in the decision-making
process to award support to
persons whose research proposal shows evidence of promise and competence, and (b) when the award is made to persons presently members of
educational institutions or the like, where there is likely support for
scientific work that evidences methodological
competence, and (c) when
the researchers in accordance with the reward structure of the organization with which they are affiliated, define their major audience as including other members of the scientific community,
and (d) when the researcher works cooperatively with the host agency in executing the research, there will be a greater likelihood of achievement in applied social
science. Our assumption is that a prerequisite for achievement is adherence to methodological
norms.
In terms of the Hagstrom question about external influences and their
effect on applied scientists, our data suggest that not only are external
factors affecting scientists’ behavior, at least the degree to which they
adhere to technical norms, but also, our comparison of the academic
versus entrepreneurial
types suggests that as the input of nonscientists
increases, so does the likelihood of their influence having a negative
impact on conformity to technical norms increase.
In terms of the implications for social policy, our exploratory findings
raise two immediate questions. First, given that the input of nonscientists
is increasing, what are the conditions under which one can translate that
input into an effect positively correlated with adherence to methodological norms. Second, given that the entrepreneurial
model is likely to
dominate in applied social science research, what mechanisms of social
control can be introduced to increase conformity to methodological
norms
within the entrepreneurial model. Both these questions make obvious the
fact that further research is needed before we can begin to delimit a model
for structuring the organization of applied research conducive to the
production of quality work.
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